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ACADEMIC DISCUSSION 
 
 
This article focuses on the dialogue be-
tween the Russian Federation and the Euro-
pean Union based on “common values” (le-
gal sphere and the rule of law), which form 
the framework for the EU-Russia “common 
spaces” — on the economy, freedom, security 
and justice, as well as in the field of research 
and education (including cultural aspects). 
The author analyses the current state of the 
EU-Russia dialogue (section 1), East-West 
cooperation in the framework of the Organi-
sation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (section 2), and the position of the 
Council of Europe member states on the 
European Court for Human Rights (section 
3). The author comes to a conclusion that the 
concept of “common values” is to a great de-
gree fictitious, and its viability depends on 
whether Russia behaves as a European coun-
try. The complete internalisation of democ-
ratic values, human rights, and good govern-
ance is still unattainable for the Russian Fed-
eration, which uses the platform of common 
values predominantly to achieve strategic 
goals (section 4). 
 
Key words: Russian Federation, EU, 
common values, cooperation, OSCE, Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights 
 
1. The EU Russia common spaces 
 
The joint EU-Russia declaration of 2003 
affirms that the parties will strengthen 
their strategic partnership on the basis of 
common values of democracy and human 
rights, as they are laid down in interna-
tional treaties. This applies in particular 
to the second and third common spaces of 
freedom/security/justice respectively ex-
ternal security. The roadmap of 2005 em-
phasizes that progress has already been 
made in the human rights dialogue be-
tween the EU and Russia. 
Although the EU and Russia have in-
deed organized a number of consultation 
rounds on human rights, progress is a 
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relative notion. The latest EU report on the common spaces (2010) identified 
just three positive developments as regards Russia and human rights: the ex-
tension of the moratorium on the death penalty, the ratification of the Four-
teenth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR — a 
ratification process which had already taken far too long for that matter), and 
a modest modernization of the Russian legal system.1 It is conspicuous that 
this report first voices its concerns over the human rights situation in Russia 
— in particular as regards the position of human rights defenders, attacks on 
journalists and activities, restrictions of the freedom of speech and associa-
tion, the situation in the northern Caucasus, en the case Khodorkovskiy. 
Moreover, it is not helpful for a constructive dialogue, from a European per-
spective, that Russia remains opposed to the involvement in the dialogue of 
ministries and agencies other than the ministry of foreign affairs, and to the 
meetings of the EU with Russia and international NGOs concerning the hu-
man rights situation in Russia.2 Finally, the Syria crisis has made it clear that 
currently, the human rights gap between the EU and Russia is nowhere as 
big as with respect to international crisis management. Although both parties 
have committed themselves, in the framework of the common space on ex-
ternal security, to respond jointly to international crises, Russia continues to 
thwart the Western demand that the UN Security Council exercise its re-
sponsibility to protect in the face of the humanitarian crisis in Syria. Accord-
ing to the European Security Strategy, this responsibility to protect citizens 
from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing is 
one of the pillars of a value-based external policy of the EU3. 
Put differently, the common values-based dialogue between the EU and 
Russia has lost its momentum, if it ever had one. Thus, it is no surprise that 
the common spaces dialogue has been reduced to strategic security questions 
regarding which the EU and Russia do have concurrent interests, like the 
fight against terrorism and terrorist financing, illegal migration, human traf-
ficking, money-laundering, and energy problems. These questions rather 
concern transnational challenges with often economic overtones, which do 
not per se require internalization of rule of law values. 
In spite of this change of focus, however, the EU does at times openly 
criticize Russia’s human rights record. For instance, the High Representative 
for the Foreign Policy of the EU, Catherine Ashton, voiced her concern over 
the arrest and conviction of opposition leaders in Moscow in May 2012, and 
reminded Russia of the freedom of speech and association, and of participa-
tion in peaceful demonstrations, fundamental rights in democratic states that, 
according to her, are also enshrined in the Russian Constitution4. 
                                                     
1 European External Action Service (EEAS); EU-Russia Common Spaces Progress 
Report 2010, March 2011. P. 49. 
2 Ibid. 
3 EU report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy - Providing 
Security in a Changing World, Brussels, 11 December 2008, S407/08, p. 2. See for a 
discussion of the role of the EU in the realization of the responsibility to protect: [3]. 
4 Statement by the Spokesperson of the EU High Representative, Catherine Ashton, on 
arrests of opposition leaders in Moscow, Brussels, 11 May 2012, Doc. nr. A 219/12. 
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In order to avoid that the EU is seen to impose ‘EU values’ on Russia, 
the EU normally refers to Russia’s own commitments in the framework of 
the Council of Europe and the OSCE.5 As both Russia and the EU member 
States (as well as shortly the EU itself, when it accedes to the ECHR) have 
legally committed themselves to the same values, the EU has an interest in 
their being respected, even if EU citizens are not victims of possible viola-
tions (the so-called erga omnes obligations). 
Given the importance of the Council of Europe and the OSCE for the 
EU-Russia dialogue, in the next sections will address the positions of the EU 
and Russia in these organizations, as well as these organizations’ attitude 
towards Russia. 
 
2. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
 
The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which 
was later transformed into the OSCE, was established to promote a security 
dialogue between the West and the Soviet sphere, on the basis of pan-
European values.6 As we write, however, common values are hard to come 
by within the OSCE. The latest OSCE summit in Vilnius (December 2011) 
again made painfully clear that the EU countries (together with the United 
States) harbour entirely different expectations from this organization than 
Russia does [22]. While Russia emphasizes the military security dimension 
of the OSCE, the EU countries advocate a more holistic ‘human security’ 
concept, that factors in human rights, democracy and good governance. After 
the summit in Vilnius, the Russian OSCE ambassador denounced that Rus-
sia’s proposals to change the OSCE into a security community were entirely 
and unacceptably ignored, while Western diplomats complained that, due to 
Russian opposition, not a single decision concerning human rights was taken 
(in particular as regards the freedom of speech and the protection of journal-
ists) [22]. 
For quite some time now, Russia has taken issue with the OSCE’s focus 
on problems ‘east of Vienna’, namely in the post-Soviet space. For most EU 
countries it is indeed unthinkable that the OSCE would concern itself with, 
for example, the fairness of the French presidential elections: is the OSCE 
not a vehicle to promote Western rule of law values in the European periph-
ery?7 This double standards attitude has been brought into even sharper relief 
                                                     
5 Roadmap, above note 2 3, p. 21 (common space of freedom, security and justice) 
and p. 35 (common space of external security). 
6 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, 
14 I.L.M. 1292 (Helsinki Declaration), preambular paragraph 4 (‘Mindful of their 
common history and recognizing that the existence of elements common to their tra-
ditions and values can assist them in developing their relations’) in combination with 
Part VII (‘Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the free-
dom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.’). 
7 Note however that the Permanent Representation of France with the Council of 
Europe invited the OSCE to monitor the French parliamentary elections of June 
2012. See OSCE/ODIHR Needs Assessment Report, Republic of France, Parliamen-
tary Elections of 10 and 17 June, Warsaw, 22 May 2012. 
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after the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, to-
gether with the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Parliamentary As-
sembly of the Council of Europe established irregularities in the Russian 
presidential elections of 4 March 2012.8 Earlier, former Russian president 
Medvedev had accused OSCE election observers from adopting an unac-
ceptable, openly political attitude, on the occasion of the OSCE monitoring 
of the Russian parliamentary elections in December (which were convinc-
ingly won by Medvedev’s and Putin’s United Russia party) [8]. In contrast, 
Russia warmly welcomes the election monitors of the Community of Inde-
pendent States: as expected, CIS observers judged the latest Russian elec-
tions as free and fair. [1] 
In Russia, the OSCE may be described as ‘the living corpse of European 
security’. This may not be an exaggeration. The OSCE has lost its place as a 
forum to negotiate pan-European disarmament after Russia denounced the 
Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe,9 the organization could not solve 
‘frozen conflicts’, such as Transdnestria, Nagorno-Karabach or South Os-
setia, nor could it prevent the brief armed conflict between Russia and Geor-
gia — both of them OSCE member States — in the summer of 2008. 
If the OSCE cannot guarantee European security, and is hopelessly di-
vided as to the values or interests it is supposed to defend, what future does 
it still have? At the moment, the OSCE may mainly serve as a useful forum 
for Russia and EU member states to denounce each other for their instru-
mentalization of the OSCE, without much risk of escalation. [12] A reform 
of the OSCE — asked for years by Russia — will in the near future continue 
to be met by EU member States and the U. S.: the latter will not be willing to 
place the autonomous OSCE institutions under more political control, to 
abandon the human security agenda, or to establish (more) OSCE missions 
for Western Europe. Nevertheless, Russia-EU cooperation will probably re-
main constructive as regards the so-called low politics issues — police coop-
eration, border control, the fight against human trafficking. [12, p. 17] As 
argued earlier, this does not per se require common European values, but 
rather a common perception of certain global or regional threats. 
 
3. The Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights 
 
The Council of Europe is probably the most important regional European 
organization promoting pan-European values of human rights, democracy 
and rule of law10. Accordingly, the expectations were high when in 1998 
                                                     
8 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report concerning Russian Fe-
deration, Presidential Election of 4 March 2012, Warsaw, 11 May 2012. 
9 Federal Law No. 276-FZ of November 29, 2007, on the Suspension by the Russian 
Federation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and Decree of 
the President of the Russian Federation No. 872 of July 13, 2007, on the Suspension 
by the Russian Federation of its Application of the Treaty on Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe and Related International Treaties. 
10 See: the Statute of the Council of Europe, London, 5 May 1949, ETS No 001, pre-
ambular paragraph 1 and Article (1)(a). 
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Russia joined the Council of Europe and acceded to its treaties11. By acced-
ing, Russia recognized the right of individuals to file a complaint with the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) alleging a violation of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, 1950). Doubtless, this has 
strengthened the position of individuals in Russia. Russia’s accession to the 
Council of Europe has indeed caused a constant stream of requests to the 
ECtHR. At the same time, a (large number of) Russian courts recognize the 
effect of the ECHR in the Russian legal order12. Nonetheless, Russia’s atti-
tude vis-à-vis the Council of Europe and the ECHR is ambiguous. On the 
one hand, Russia wishes to loyally carry out the commitments made, by, 
among other things, announcing rather far-reaching legal reforms. On the 
other hand, a considerable part of the political establishment is not amused 
by the large number of judgments of the Court faulting Russia, thee ensuing 
high costs for Russia, and the threats posed by legal reform to the — for cer-
tain stakeholders beneficial — status quo. 
The latter explains, inter alia, why Russia delayed the entry into force of 
Protocol nr. 14 to the ECHR — which increases the efficiency of the Court’s 
judicial procedure — why fundamental legal reforms that would allow the Rus-
sian legal system to function in accordance with the demands of Strasbourg are 
not carried out to their fullest extent13, and why some Russian officials refuse to 
cooperate with the Court. In the Katyn case (2012), for instance, Russia refused 
to hand over necessary documents to the Court, as a result of which the latter 
could not pronounce itself on the Russian investigation of the mass murder of 
Polish officers during the Second World War in Katyn14.  
But it also possibly explains why the ECtHR at times seems to spare 
Russia. In the Khodorkovskiy case (2011), for instance, the Court ruled that 
there was no evidence that the Russian government had initiated the prosecu-
tion against the oligarch Khodorkovskiy to appropriate the assets of the 
Yukos oil firm15. One may safely assume that the Court, by adopting this 
pragmatic attitude, wanted to meet the concerns of those who argue that the 
Court is involving itself too deeply in the internal political affairs of Russia 
                                                     
11 See for a more extensive analysis of the relationship between Russia and the 
Council of Europe: [17]. 
12 See for a more extensive analysis: [21]. 
13 The ECtHR employs the so-called ‘pilot procedure’ to allow the Contracting Par-
ties to carry out fundamental reforms in case of systematic human rights violations. 
Often a pilot judgment in one ECHR case suspends the procedure in all other cases 
in which the same systemic problem arises, until the state remedies it. See for the 
pilot procedure with respect to Russia in: [13]. 
14 EctHR. Janowiec and Others v. Russia, Application nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, 
16 April 2012. 
15 Such a prosecution would violate Article 18 ECHR. See ECHR, Khodorkovksiy v. 
Russia, Application no. 5829/04, 31 May 2011. In the Yukos case, however, the 
Court held that the Russian authorities had meted out unreasonable punishment to 
Yukos for tax violations, and had given the company insufficient time to prepare its 
defense. The Court reserved the question of compensation for a later date, however. 
See EHRM, OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia, Application no. 
14902/04, 20 September 2011. 
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[18]. Also in judgments rendered in cases involving other — Western — 
states has the Court adopted such a stance: in the case Lautsi, the Court’s 
Grand Chamber overruled an earlier decision of the Court that had obliged 
Italy to remove crucifixes from public schools16. In fact, the criticism leveled 
at the Court in some Western states does not fundamentally differ from Rus-
sia’s criticism: a lack of sensitivity of the Court for local circumstances and 
perceptions, or in more legal terms, too narrow an interpretation of the mar-
gin of appreciation left to the member States. Especially in the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom, calls to restrict the Court’s power sound increas-
ingly louder17. Ironically, the United Kingdom — the European country that 
probably has the worst relations with Russia — is currently running errands 
for Russia by advocating a radical overhaul of the Court. In 2012, the British 
conservative government proposed to codify the principles of subsidiarity 
and margin of appreciation (to protect member States’ national sovereignty 
as regards value judgments) and to render admissibility determinations 
stricter (to clear the Court’s backlog, but also indirectly to limit the number 
of cases against member States). Quite reasonably, in human rights circles it 
was pointed out that such a reform of the Court would mainly have perni-
cious effects for Russian applicants [16]. 
It could be gleaned from the foregoing analysis that Russia’s critical 
stance vis-à-vis the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human 
Rights is hardly unique, and is shared in some Western European circles. If 
also the West increasingly emphasizes the local cultural anchoring of values, 
the quest for values which the EU countries and the Russia have in common 
becomes nearly impossible. One would almost forgive the cynic who con-
cludes that the protection of national sovereignty against supranational control is 
the only value shared by the (cited) EU countries and Russia. In any event, the 
stance adopted by an EU member State such as the United Kingdom vis-à-vis 
the Court can hardly be said to further the integration of Russia into the Euro-
pean value system: it provides new ammunition for those in Russia who accuse 
the West of using double standards in its human rights discourse. 
 
4. Concluding observations 
 
The ‘dialogue’ in the framework of the EU-Russia common spaces, and 
the dynamics within the OSCE and the Council of Europe make it clear that 
Russia and the EU member States mainly pay lip-service to common, pan-
European rule of law values, at several levels. The human rights dialogue in 
the framework of the EU common spaces appears to be a dialogue of the 
deaf. The OSCE has become a minor player because of the divergent priori-
ties of Russia and the West. The future of the European Court of Human 
Rights — which supervises the implementation of the European values that 
                                                     
16 ECtHR Grand Chamber. Lautsi v. Italy. Application no. 30814/06, 18 March 2011. 
17 See for the Dutch critics: [4; 23; 9, p. 608). As far as the UK is concerned, it is es-
pecially the Court’s decision that UK prisoners have the right to vote which has 
raised eyebrows (Hirst v. United Kingdom , Application no. 74025/01, 6 October 
2005). See [15]. 
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are enshrined in legally enforceable rules — vis-à-vis Russia is unclear, but 
the various possible scenarios are no cause for optimism. Either the Court 
adopts a hands-off approach (see Khodorkovskiy), Russia refuses to cooper-
ate with the Court (see Katyn) or to give effect to its decisions, or the mem-
ber States of the Council of Europe limit the Court’s power. Either way, the 
advocates of pan-European values stand to lose. 
The dialogue between the EU and Russia will continue to exist, but the 
danger is real that Russia will use it selectively and instrumentally to realize 
its own strategic objectives, without fully internalizing European values18. 
Inevitably, this raises the question whether Russia truly belongs to Europe or 
rather to Asia. For ages the exact Russian identity has been the subject of 
discussion — both in Russia and in the West19; it fluctuated throughout the 
ages depending on political preferences. As is known, the very origins of 
Russia are the Christian values that also determined Western cultural life 
[14]. In the early 18th century Peter the Great (further) ‘europeanized’ Rus-
sia, and in the 19th century, after Napoleon’s defeat, Russiawas undeniably a 
leading player in the European concert of nations. This ‘European identity’ 
was rejected in the 20th century, when the Soviet Union defined its identity 
specifically in opposition to the ‘capitalist’ West. The late 1980s and the 
1990s again witnessed a rapprochement of Russian elites and the West: in 
1987 Gorbachev emphasized that the West and the Soviet Union were part 
of a ‘common European home’[10, p. 191], and a later Russian minister of 
foreign affairs added that Russians defined their subjective identity as 
‘European’[11, p. 10]. 
 
Since 2000, when Putin come to power, Russia seems to distance itself 
again from the West. It is not unlikely that Russia will increasingly seek to 
emphasize its nexus to Asia and seek a rapprochement with China to develop 
a values project that competes with the Western model20. The importance of 
Russia’s relationship with Asia and China can notably be derived from 
Putin’s article ‘Russia and the changing world’, published during the presi-
dential election campaign of 2012 [2]. However, what this (Eur-)Asian val-
ues project precisely consists of, except defense of national sovereignty, 
primacy of the community over the individual, and opposition to foreign in-
terference in internal affairs, remains an open question. 
 
This article summurises the results of the research work presented at the 
conference “EU-Russia common space: probems and solutions”. 
The conference was organized by the EU Centre of the I. Kant Baltic 
Federal University (www. kantiana. ru/eu4u) in Veliky Novgorod on May 
25—26, 2012 
                                                     
18 This instrumentalization is also notable in other republics of the post-Soviet space. 
See in particular: [5, p.79-80] (authors positing in this respect that the EU stabilizes 
rather than transforms). 
19 See on the ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ identities of  Russia [7]. See on the non-
European ‘objective’ identity for example [20, p.166].   
20 See [19]. The EU’s external normative attraction in this respect is possibly exag-
gerated: [6, p.649]. 
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